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Abstract
Detecting deception in natural language has a
wide variety of applications, but because of
its hidden nature there are currently no public,
large-scale sources of labeled deceptive text.
This work introduces the Mafiascum dataset1,
a collection of over 700 games of Mafia, in
which players are randomly assigned either
deceptive or non-deceptive roles and then in-
teract via forum postings. Over 9000 docu-
ments were compiled from the dataset, which
each contained all messages written by a sin-
gle player in a single game. This corpus was
used to construct a set of hand-picked linguis-
tic features based on prior deception research,
as well as a set of average word vectors en-
riched with subword information. A logistic
regression classifier fit on a combination of
these feature sets achieved an average preci-
sion of 0.39 (chance = 0.26) and an AUROC
of 0.68 on 5000+ word documents. On 50+
word documents, an average precision of 0.29
(chance = 0.23) and an AUROC of 0.59 was
achieved.
1 Introduction
A reliable automatic deception detector for writ-
ten communication would find wide application
in intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and on-
line marketplaces. Of course, deception is hard to
find and label because of its deceitful nature: de-
ceivers are aiming to not be caught, and as such do
not advertise their successes. Moreover, it is often
unclear whether falsehoods are deliberate, and, in
the case of spam, whether deception is deliberately
transparent (Herley, 2012). As such, a major hur-
dle in applying supervised learning techniques to
deception detection is the lack of a suitable pub-
licly available dataset.
1https://bitbucket.org/bopjesvla/
thesis/src
Although deception takes place in a large num-
ber of datasets, such as court transcripts (Pe´rez-
Rosas et al., 2015), the Enron email corpus (Keila
and Skillicorn, 2005), and laboratory experiments
(Pe´rez-Rosas and Mihalcea, 2015), to date all
public labeled datasets comparable in size to
high-profile sentiment analysis benchmarks (e.g.
Rosenthal et al., 2017) focus on single-sentence
non-interactive deception (e.g. Pe´rez-Rosas et al.,
2015; Wang, 2017). In this paper, we introduce a
naturalistic dataset, a collection of over 700 games
of Mafia played on an Internet forum, in which
players are assigned either a deceptive or a non-
deceptive role. The final dataset consists of over
9000 documents, which each contains all mes-
sages written by a single player in a single game.
The average document contains 3940 words. We
test a variety of established linguistic cues to de-
ception on this dataset, as well as testing word em-
beddings.
1.1 Linguistic Cues to Deception
Until the 1970s, research aimed at detecting de-
ception was largely focused on finding nonverbal
cues (e.g., body language and facial expressions)
for use in face-to-face interactions. After Mehra-
bian (1971) found that slow, erroneous and sparse
speech can indicate deception, systemic research
into linguistic cues to deception took off.
In a recent meta-analysis of 79 linguistic cues
to deception from 44 studies, Hauch et al. (2015)
found that deceivers express more negative emo-
tions, distance themselves from events (using less
perceptual and sensory language), and generally
appear to experience more cognitive load as com-
pared to non-deceivers. More specifically, de-
ceivers produced fewer words and fewer distinct
words than truth-tellers, while using more sen-
tences. Additionally, deception was found to
correlate with the use of negation terms (e.g.,
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‘no’, ‘never’, and ‘not’) and words specifically re-
lated to negative emotions and anger (e.g., ‘hate’,
‘worthless’, ‘enemy’). Deceivers used fewer ex-
clusive words (e.g., ‘but’, ‘or’, and ‘without’) than
non-deceivers, as well as fewer tentative words
(e.g., ‘may’, ‘seem’, and ‘perhaps’). Deceivers
used fewer total first-person pronouns than truth-
tellers, but used second- and third-person pro-
nouns more often than truth-tellers do. Deceivers
also used fewer sensory and perceptual details
than truth-tellers, especially in the acoustic realm
(e.g., ‘listen’, ‘sound’, or ‘speak’), as opposed to
sight or feeling. Deceivers produced more motion
verbs (e.g., walk, go, or move). Finally, compared
to truth-tellers deceivers also used fewer words
concerning their inner thoughts (insight) and cog-
nitive processes.
The meta-analysis supported the observation by
Hancock and Woodworth (2013) that the signifi-
cance of linguistic cues to deception is heavily de-
pendent on context. In particular, effect sizes var-
ied wildly across different interaction conditions,
types of deception, modes of communication, de-
ceivers’ motivations, and differences in emotional
valence. In one case, even the direction of the ef-
fect of a significant linguistic cue differed between
contexts. Studies included in the meta-analysis
skew towards contexts that are different from on-
line Mafia in terms of setting, mode of communi-
cation, interactivity, deception type, and possibly
participant demographics, limiting direct compar-
ison to our study, but it is the only comprehensive
survey of systematic research of cues to deception
we know of.
1.2 The Game of Mafia
The original face-to-face version of the game of
Mafia, also known as Werewolf, was designed by
Dmitry Davidoff in the 1980s to model a conspir-
acy of an informed minority, the Mafia, within an
uninformed majority, the townsfolk. Before the
game starts, every player is randomly assigned to
one of these teams. The goal of the Mafia, who,
unlike the townsfolk, are aware each others’ iden-
tities, is to vote out all townsfolk, while the town’s
objective is to vote out all Mafiosi. Being elimi-
nated precludes townsfolk nor Mafia from winning
with their team, to prevent conflict of interest.
The game starts with an in-game Day, during
which the players discuss their suspicions, or, in
the case of the Mafia, pretend to, and try to agree
on a vote. When a majority vote is reached on
a player, that player is eliminated from the game,
their role and alignment are announced publicly
by the moderator, and the game goes on to the
Night. In games without special roles, also known
as vanilla or mountainous, the only action per-
formed during the Night is the elimination of an-
other player by the Mafia. In face-to-face games,
this is usually done by the Mafia pointing at the
target while the townsfolk have their eyes closed.
When the Mafia have reached a non-verbal agree-
ment and their eyes are closed again, the game
moderator announces the name, role, and align-
ment of the eliminated player, everyone “wakes
up” and the game goes on to the next Day.
Mafia has been adopted by a large number of
online communities. On the Internet, Days are
usually played out in a public forum thread or
chat room and the Mafia decide on the eliminated
player by private messages.
An experiment run by Zhou et al. (2004) shares
multiple similarities with later studies that use the
online game of Mafia as a model for deception,
which includes our study. Rather than Mafia, an-
other consensus-building task was used, in which
the goal is to persuade another person of a plan in a
hypothetical survival scenario. The test group was
told to convince their partner of a predetermined
solution they were told was incorrect, while the
control group was instructed to argue for their true
views. Task communication occurred outside the
lab over email, across a timespan of several days.
The authors noted that this reduced the amount of
experimental control, but also in their eyes less-
ened the pressure and unnaturalness felt by partici-
pants, perhaps making the experiment more repre-
sentative of real-life deception. Participation was
compulsory for students, and no additional reward
was given for successful deception.
In contrast with prior research, the study found
that deceivers wrote more than truth-tellers. The
authors pointed to the persuasive nature of the
task, which requires deceivers to come up with ar-
guments to support their claims. Another possible
explanation, not discussed by the authors, is that
the task was more interesting for deceivers than
for the control group, causing a difference in the
amount of effort put in.
Zhou and Sung (2008) collected 1192 Mafia
games from a popular Chinese website dedicated
to this game. The dataset differs from the Mafias-
cum dataset used in our study, which is explored
in detail below, in many respects. All players were
Chinese and all messages were written in Chinese.
The deadline to decide on a single elimination was
3 minutes, during which all players were expected
to stay in the chat room. The dataset only included
games with a size ranging from 6 to 8 players, of
which only one player was a deceiver.
In this setting, the deceivers’ average word
count was found to be low compared to truth-
tellers, which is inconsistent with Zhou et al.
(2004), but consistent with most other previous
research. Additionally, the vocabulary of the de-
ceivers tended to be more diverse, which is incon-
sistent with both Zhou et al. (2004) and other pre-
vious research. The authors attributed these incon-
sistencies to cultural differences between the Chi-
nese Mafia players and American students and dif-
ferences between email and chat rooms, but they
could also be the result of higher engagement from
the truth-tellers: since the Chinese players chose
to play voluntarily, it is reasonable to assume that
they were more invested in hunting for deceptive
players than the students who were required to par-
ticipate in an experiment and who did not even
know they might be deceived.
1.3 Machine Learning Classification
The performance of many recent text classifica-
tion techniques on deception datasets is unknown.
This is unfortunate for those interested in sys-
tematically detecting deception, but also for those
in the business of creating general text classifica-
tion techniques. Intuitively, deception detection is
quite different from most text classification prob-
lems, as it does not allow classifiers to base their
predictions solely on explicit information the au-
thor intended to convey, such as their opinion on
a movie. Instead, it requires classifiers to find im-
plicit information the author intended to hide.
In the case of Mafia, the deceiving condition
is randomly assigned to players in the game of
Mafia, whereas many popular text classification
benchmarks, such as most large sentiment analysis
datasets, are passively observed. Because of this,
the negative signal a performant sentiment classi-
fier picks up on may not be negative sentiment, but
the writing style of the type of person who pub-
lishes negative movie reviews on the Internet, for
example.
Much of the less recent machine learning re-
search on deception used Support Vector Ma-
chines. Mihalcea and Strapparava (2009) col-
lected data from three written deception tasks. Ap-
plying only basic stemming and using nothing
but raw stem counts, a Support Vector Machine
trained on one of the tasks correctly classified 70%
of the documents from that task on average. Using
the same setup, a Naive Bayes classifier reached
71%. Additionally, an SVM trained on two tasks
was able to correctly classify 58% of the docu-
ments from the third task, while the Naive Bayes
classifier reached a classification rate of 60%.
State-of-the-art document classification tech-
niques that have not been used in deception de-
tection tasks include deep neural networks and
word embeddings enriched with subword infor-
mation (Bojanowski et al., 2016). The latter is
promising because of its performance on syntac-
tic tasks, since many cues to deception are plain
syntactic groups. The FastText project provides
word embeddings enriched with subword informa-
tion for 294 languages, opening up the possibility
to transfer some of the methods in this paper to
deception in other languages. Regular word em-
beddings (Bengio et al., 2003) have been used to
detect deception, producing results comparable to
simpler techniques (Mihaylov and Nakov, 2016),
although this may be explained by the fact that the
dataset used in the relevant study was not random-
ized with large differences between groups.
In this paper, hand-picked text features that have
previously been proven to be successful in clas-
sifying deception are compared to average word
vectors enriched with subword information. Ad-
ditionally, we define a benchmark for text classifi-
cation pipelines on the Mafiascum dataset.
2 The Dataset
In 2002, Mafiascum2, a forum dedicated to games
of Mafia and discussion of Mafia theory, was
started. It has six million posts. In-game Day
phases on Mafiascum usually last two weeks, dur-
ing which players are expected to post at least ev-
ery 48 hours. If a player cannot play anymore
because of unforeseen circumstances, their slot is
filled by a new player who is expected to read the
entire game before continuing in their place.
Although Mafiascum currently runs four types
of Mafia games, only the Normal archives include
easily parsable alignment distributions for almost
2https://forum.mafiascum.net
all games. Normal games are characterized by the
use of a limited set of well-known roles and me-
chanics. This is fortunate, since extreme devia-
tions to Mafia present in some non-Normal games
may introduce linguistic noise that is unrelated to
deception.
Still, a few noise-introducing deviations are
present in our dataset. Until 2014, multiple play-
ers were allowed to play as a single player under
a single account. Game moderators have always
been allowed to put multiple competing minority
factions in one game.
Although Mafiascum remains active to date,
real-time games of Mafia have surpassed forum
games in popularity. Unfortunately, most real-
time games of Mafia have a high number of ad-
ditional roles, making the game less suitable as a
linguistic model for deception. For example, on
Epicmafia3, which has been used in non-linguistic
deception research (Pak and Zhou, 2012), the op-
timal strategy for players with special roles is of-
ten to immediately publicly claim to have such a
role, confirming their alignment. In other games,
the optimal strategy for the Mafia is to have one
Mafia member falsely claim to have a leading role
themselves, effectively confirming to the towns-
folk that one of two players is Mafia. In most
Normal games on Mafiascum, the list of roles and
alignments present in the game is not known to
players.
Critically, in these games, deceptive language
is not the only signal a classifier can detect to
differentiate between the Mafia and the towns-
folk. A classifier that can detect uncontested role
claims could correctly identify some townsfolk,
not based on their linguistic signature, but based
on the fact that the Mafia cannot make uncon-
tested role claims in most Epicmafia games. In the
Mafiascum dataset, the extent of this problem is
smaller, since absolute public confirmation of non-
eliminated players is relatively rare. Exact num-
bers are hard to come by, but in a random sample
of five thirteen-player games, no such confirma-
tions occurred.
2.1 Investigation of Possible Confounders
In some online gaming communities, a small num-
ber of unusually active players account for a dis-
proportionately large part of produced data, which
may bias a classifier to perform well only on this
3https://epicmafia.com
Figure 1: Histogram of word counts per user per game
small set of players. After preprocessing, our
dataset includes 9676 documents from 685 games.
The most active user account has played in 57
games, accounting for an equal number of docu-
ments in the dataset. It should be noted that many
active players have less-used alternative accounts,
making this a lower bound. Nonetheless, look-
ing at the activity distribution, we expect that no
player has played in more than 20% of all games,
accounting for no more than 1.6% of all docu-
ments.
Another concern pertains to the fact that Mafia
are slightly more likely to be replaced than towns-
folk. In our dataset, an average town-aligned slot
has 0.33 replacements, while an average Mafia-
aligned slot has 0.35 replacements, meaning that a
replacement is 6% more likely to be Mafia. Since
replacements often use very distinctive language,
providing comments on the entirety of the game
when they first catch up, we expect that replace-
ment detection can reliably be used as a proxy
for deception. Throwing out all documents from
slots with replacements would solve this, but it is
a harsh measure, since they make up a sizable por-
tion of the dataset, even among the larger docu-
ments (Figure 1). In the results section, we show
that the removal of replacement documents does
not decrease the overall performance, at least not
for our simple linear model. Because of this, re-
placement documents were included in the pub-
lished dataset.
Although player alignments are randomized
within games, the townsfolk-Mafia ratio is decided
by moderators on a per-game basis. As the game
progresses, it may become clear to players that a
large number of Mafia are in the game, either be-
cause of setup speculation or because players of
multiple Mafia factions have been eliminated al-
ready. Player may discuss this: “This game prob-
ably has lots of Mafia.” If such a phrase were to
be used consistently by all players in games with a
high Mafia-townsfolk ratio, including the Mafia, a
classifier would assume this phrase to be indicative
of deception. This is not necessarily a confounder:
in real life, deception occurs more in some groups
than others, and people’s speculation on this mat-
ter may help deception detection. However, it may
hurt the generalizability of the classifier.
According to veteran players, the way Mafia is
played on Mafiascum has shifted over time. This
includes high-level subjective criteria such as the
preferred way to start discussion at the start of the
game, popular modes of analysis, and the extent
to which players express emotion, but it also in-
cludes the average post count and post length in
a game. While communication was very struc-
tured and reminiscent of debating in the early
days, bursts of stream-of-consciousness posting
have become more and more common over time.
Initially, we expected the townsfolk-Mafia ratio
to have varied over time as well, since setup de-
sign has changed in many ways since 2002. For-
tunately, the townsfolk-Mafia ratio has remained
consistent over time, making time period an un-
likely confounding variable.
Another possible confounder that ended up be-
ing moot was game size. Large games typi-
cally have more experienced players, more re-
placements, and a higher game length than small
games, all of which could be reflected in language
use. We also expected game size to influence the
dependent variable, since the percentage of play-
ers aligned to the Mafia needed to balance a vanilla
game of Mafia decreases as game size increases
(Migdal, 2010). Surprisingly, this effect seems to
be entirely counteracted by the special roles and
mechanics on Mafiascum; no relation between the
percentage of Mafia members and game size ex-
ists.
Finally, one should keep in mind that although
there is no known public record of demographics,
the Mafiascum userbase is unlikely to be represen-
tative of the global population or the population of
regular participants of scientific studies.
2.2 Unpublished Work by Mafiascum
Members
Multiple Mafiascum members have performed
systemic analyses of cues to deception. In a pri-
vate forum, Mafiascum user Psyche posted that
logistic regression, multinomial naive Bayes clas-
sification, binomial naive Bayes, and an ensem-
ble performed no better than random on a recur-
sive feature selection of an unspecified feature set.
Equal numbers of town and scum were taken from
each game.
Mafiascum user goodmorning (2014) found that
Mafia are just as likely as townsfolk to be part of
an elimination vote on another Mafia member in
games for new players. Also in games for new
players, Mafiascum user Toomai (2014) found that
the Mafia elimination rate is higher than chance
in the majority of game states, although there are
states, such as the start of the game, where random
and directed lynching have equal performance.
Even in game states where the elimination rate is
better than chance, this is not necessarily caused
by good player judgment, as it could also be the
result of the special roles included in games for
new players.
Mafiascum user Loopdan (2019) found that new
players are significantly more likely to be aligned
to the Mafia if they post a greeting to all players
at the start of the game. An attempted replica-
tion on our dataset, which was mostly produced
by non-new players, failed. The occurrence of
generic greetings appeared to be much lower in
our dataset. This may be the result of experienced
players being more composed, or more aware of
how games typically start.
3 Machine Learning Benchmark
The Mafiascum dataset seems promising not only
for deception research but also as a general bench-
mark for supervised text classification pipelines.
We propose the following benchmark task: Take
a twenty-fold stratified shuffle split of all docu-
ments with a word count of 50 or higher. For ev-
ery fold, fit a fresh instance of the pipeline on the
training set. Use that instance to generate predic-
tions for the test set. These predictions should at
least be scored using the area under the precision-
recall curve. The baseline score set by this paper
is 0.286. A Python implementation of this bench-
mark is included with the dataset.
4 Methods
Games of Mafia and alignment distributions
were scraped from Mafiascum’s Normal Game
archives. The scraping code, which uses the
JavaScript bookmarklet artoo.js, and the resulting
JSON output are included in the dataset4 along
with the output of the preprocessing and feature
construction steps described below.
4.1 Preprocessing
Games that did not have a complete alignment dis-
tribution available were discarded.
Since games are moderated by humans, there
is a period between a conclusive elimination vote
and the role reveal, which is known as twilight.
Eliminated townsfolk usually speak freely during
this period, but eliminated Mafia members often
clam up, wary of giving the town additional in-
formation on their partners. The exception to this
is the moments after the final elimination, when
many players have often revealed their alignment
before the moderator has officially declared a win.
In any case, seeing that eliminated players have no
incentive to keep up their personal facade, post-
elimination and post-game posts should not be in-
cluded in the dataset. As such, all posts after
the final vote count, which signifies the end of
the game, were discarded. Additionally, to catch
posts from eliminated players in twilight, all posts
a player made in the 24 hours before their last in-
game post, including their last in-game post, was
also discarded. A 24-hour cut-off was chosen be-
cause moderators typically check in on a game at
least once a day.
For every player in every game, the remaining
in-game posts were merged into a single text doc-
ument. If the remaining number of words in a
document was lower than 50, the document was
discarded. Each document was assigned a binary
label, signifying whether or not the document’s
author was Mafia. Documents from players with
a role named the Serial Killer, a third-party lone
wolf faction, were removed.
If multiple players occupied a slot at different
times because of player replacement, their posts
were put in separate documents, but if two play-
ers played together under a single account, this
could not automatically be detected. As a result,
a minority of the documents contain posts written
4https://bitbucket.org/bopjesvla/
thesis/src
by different players. This introduces no systemic
bias, but it may introduce noise.
4.2 Feature Construction
All remaining documents were split into words,
where a word is defined as a series of characters
marked as letters in the Unicode database, which
includes numbers. Most hand-picked features
were adapted from the meta-analysis by Hauch
et al. (2015), with the exception of two features
specific to the communication medium: message
length and the number of messages sent per 24
hours. Word category frequencies were computed
for word category cues the meta-analysis reported
significant effects on, which are described in the
introduction.
Instead of the frequency of exclusive words,
however, we computed the term frequencies for
the words “but” and “or”. Because exclusive
words are less related to each other than the other
word categories that we use to identify deception,
such as first-person pronouns, we believe distinct
exclusive words may relate to deception in differ-
ent ways. The counts of other exclusive words
were not used as features, since “but” and “or”
are much more common than all other exclusive
words combined. Therefore, the signal found in
previous research likely originated from one of
these subfeatures.
The word count per 24 hours, the average to-
ken length, and the average sentence length were
also computed for every document. Every hand-
picked feature was scaled based on its variance.
An overview of all features along with their corre-
lations to truth-telling is shown in Table 1.
Pretrained 300-dimensional word vectors with
subword information, trained on the English
Wikipedia, were obtained from FastText (2018).
The words in each document were mapped to their
corresponding word vectors, using the subword
information to compute word vectors for out-of-
vocabulary words. After this, we computed the
average of all word vectors for each document, re-
sulting in a single vector with a dimensionality of
300 per document.
A third feature set was created by repeating
the previous procedure, this time using word
vectors without subword information trained on
Wikipedia and Gigaword, obtained from GloVe
(2014). In this case, out-of-vocabulary words had
to be discarded.
Feature AUROC
Message length 0.552
Messages / 24 hrs 0.453
Word Count / 24 hrs 0.490
“or” ratio 0.501
3rd-person pronoun ratio 0.533
2nd-person pronoun ratio 0.476
First-person pronoun ratio 0.498
“but” ratio 0.543
Token length 0.506
Type-token ratio 0.487
Sentence length 0.453
Anger ratio 0.496
Sensory words ratio 0.520
Cognitive process words ratio 0.503
Insight word ratio 0.506
Motion word ratio 0.491
“not” ratio 0.497
Quantifiers ratio 0.532
Negative emotion words ratio 0.499
Tentative words ratio 0.513
Table 1: AUROCs, or common language effect sizes,
for linguistic variables. Values smaller than 0.5 indicate
higher prevalence among deceivers. Boldface indicates
a significant Mann-Whitney U test. Features above the
ruler are specific to forum communication. Features
below the ruler are adapted from Hauch et al. (2015).
Ratios are word (category) frequencies.
Two more feature sets were created by con-
catenating the hand-picked features to each of the
word vector feature sets.
4.3 Machine Learning Benchmark
Implementing the benchmark described above, a
regularized (C = 1.0) logistic regression model
was trained and tested on a stratified 20-fold split
of each feature set. For training, the two classes
were reweighted using the heuristic devised by
King and Zeng (2001).
In addition to class weighting, we also
reweighted individual training samples based on
their word count. The intuition behind this is sim-
ple: a 10000-word deceptive document typically
contains more information about deception than a
100-word document, but not as much as 100 inde-
pendent 100-word documents. Because no litera-
ture could be found on this type of reweighting, we
took a conservative approach: the sample weight
of a document was set to the log of the word count,
meaning that the weight of a 10000-word docu-
ment was set twice as high as the weight of a 100-
word document of the same class.
Experiments with paragraph vectors and single-
post classification (as opposed to the practice
of concatenating multiple posts into documents)
were abandoned in early stages as they did not
seem to hold any promise.
5 Results
5.1 Statistical Analysis
Of the 18 features adapted from the cues Hauch
et al. (2015) found to have significant effects, 6
were also significant in the Mafiascum dataset, al-
though all effect sizes were small (Table 1). Of
those 6, only 2 features, sentence length and the
ratio of third-person pronouns, had the same di-
rection as in the primary meta-analysis. The un-
expected result that four features replicated in the
opposite direction is investigated in the discussion.
Of all features that were originally introduced in
deception research under the assumption that com-
plexity is a proxy for truthfulness, sentence length
was the only one to have the expected negative
correlation to deception. Deception was not cor-
related with word length, nor with the type-token
ratio. Neither of the exclusive words indicated
truthfulness. Usage of the word “but” correlated
positively with deception, while usage of the word
“or” did not predict anything. This casts doubt on
the common practice of grouping exclusive words
together in linguistic deception research.
Deceptive roles were significantly positively
correlated with post length, but negatively corre-
lated with post frequency. No significant correla-
tion between word count and deception was found.
5.2 Machine Learning
The logistic regression model performed signifi-
cantly better than chance on all feature sets (Ta-
ble 2). No model trained on one feature set per-
formed significantly better than a model trained on
another.
Removing documents from slots with player
replacements did not decrease classifier perfor-
mance, warranting their inclusion in the dataset
despite the possibility of a weak confounding ef-
fect, as explained in the Dataset section.
Feature set AUROC AP
Hand-picked 0.566 [0.552, 0.579] 0.270
FastText 0.578 [0.565, 0.592] 0.279
HP + FastText 0.593 [0.579, 0.606] 0.286
GloVe 0.572 [0.558, 0.585] 0.275
HP + GloVe 0.583 [0.570, 0.597] 0.285
HP + FT - repl 0.596 [0.579, 0.612] 0.280
Table 2: Cross-validated performance of the models
trained on different feature sets (AUROC = area un-
der the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve includ-
ing 95% confidence intervals, AP = average precision
[chance = 0.23], “- repl” = replacements removed from
train and test set)
Word count N AUROC AP
50+ 9676 0.593 0.286
5000+ 2401 0.651 0.344
50-999 2592 0.547 0.250
1000-2999 3120 0.589 0.292
3000-4999 1563 0.603 0.308
5000-6999 824 0.678 0.385
7000-8999 538 0.678 0.360
9000-10999 310 0.587 0.301
11000+ 729 0.623 0.322
Table 3: Cross-validated performance of the model
trained on HP + FastText by word count segment
6 Discussion
The Mafiascum dataset seems promising not only
for deception research but also as a text classifica-
tion benchmark. The most worrisome hypothetical
confounding variables between games did not ap-
pear to require any controlling, and deceptive roles
are randomly assigned to players per game. Com-
bined with the fact that deceptive players attempt
to hide their label, this dataset tests for aspects of
text classification that most benchmark datasets do
not.
All effect sizes of the hand-picked features were
small, which may be due to the slow pace of the
game or the experience many players already have
playing as a deceiver. The latter property has real-
world relevance, since many deceivers of interest
are repeat offenders. Despite the small effect sizes,
a logistic regression model trained on the hand-
picked features performed significantly better than
chance.
Of the six significant hand-picked features taken
or adapted from the meta-analysis by Hauch et al.
(2015), only two, sentence length (+) and the ratio
of third-person pronouns (-), matched the direc-
tion of the effect found in the meta-analysis. The
ratio of second-person pronouns; the ratio of sen-
sory words; the ratio of the word “but”, which is
a subfeature of the more commonly used ratio of
exclusive words; and the ratio of quantifiers did
not match the direction of the effect found in the
meta-analysis.
However, the authors of the meta-analysis notes
that the link between quantifiers and truthfulness
was based on only four studies. They urge the
reader not to draw strong conclusions about this
cue, considering that the theoretical foundation is
off: all other cues based on descriptive words,
such as prepositions, did not predict truth-telling.
Other discrepancies in this study might be the
result of differences in context and willingness to
deceive. In our dataset, second-person pronouns
are used less by deceivers and the word ”but” is
used more, which might point at deceivers trying
to persuade people, instead of pretending to com-
municate with them. This is also supported by
the positive relation between deception and third-
person pronouns. The reason for the correlation
between sensory words and deception remains un-
clear.
Two features specific to the communication
medium were included: message length and mes-
sage frequency. Deceptive roles were significantly
positively correlated with message length, but neg-
atively correlated with message frequency. Con-
sidering that no significant relation between word
count per 24 hours and deception was found, this
likely means that deceivers refrain from posting
in certain situations, perhaps because they would
prefer to hear a genuine opinion first, perhaps be-
cause they think any contribution they make is go-
ing to attract unwanted attention, or perhaps be-
cause they dislike playing as a deceiver.
In a similar vein, the shorter posts from towns-
folk may be the result of relatively unfiltered ex-
pression. Townsfolk may believe that they can
broadcast any idea they come up with the mo-
ment they come up with it, since they know their
thoughts are genuine. Mafia may feel the need to
add more detail to their personal narrative.
The results in this paper are yet another strike
against the idea that a linear model fit on tradi-
tional linguistic markers of deception can gener-
alize across deception contexts. There is a slim
chance that a linear model trained on average word
vectors does generalize across contexts, but in our
mind, it seems more likely that a model capable of
capturing the interactions between deception con-
text and word usage is required.
We expect that to train any model to detect de-
ception across contexts, a large amount of decep-
tive and non-deceptive documents gathered from
a multitude of contexts is needed. As such, we
urge deception researchers to publish their datasets
whenever possible.
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